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COUNTER-TERRORISM: Is There a North–South Divide? A case study of Indian state’s counter-terrorism efforts Introduction
The biggest threat to state’s security, in today’s era, is the incessant fear of terrorist attacks killing innocent people and challenging the state’s monopoly in the use of force. After 9\11, the counter-terrorism policy and strategies have become an important plank of state’s efforts ensuring security from impending terrorist strikes. All states, whether from north or south, are required to draw up strategies and take adequate measures which conform to the international counter-terrorism efforts. The countries in the north had sought a far more militaristic posture on terrorism evident by the Global War on Terror buttressed by the availability of ample resources and technological superiority. In this paper, I argue that countries in the south, due to their demography and historical legacy have a political take on the issue of terrorism in relation to the northern countries. I would focus on India’s case where despite of the domestic compulsions and external dimensions of the emerging global norms on counter-terrorism, after 9\11, the state’s counter-terrorism efforts is much more political than militaristic. The recurrence of terrorist acts, as studies show, is due to its arch rivalry and the eventual sub conventional warfare launched by Pakistan. But, more importantly, India has score of home-grown problems catapulting as terrorist acts: noticeable are militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, North East Insurgency and left wing extremism in the central India and Bihar coupled with Maoist violence. In this paper I argue that India’s lack of coherent counter-terrorism efforts and its political take, often dubbed as “soft approach” , is more due to domestic dissonance then the lack of capability which is more an effect then being a cause. I will, in this paper, analyse the impact of geopolitical realities, demographic composition and lack of adequate counter-terrorism paraphernalia caused by inadequate resources, both financial and human; and their shaping of the Indian state’s counter-terrorism efforts. The transnational linkages of domestic terrorist groups in a globalised world are an inevitable scenario, further complicating the situation. The conundrum which the Indian state faces is how to balance its external obligations as a responsible state with the domestic challenges which is impairing the security of the state as well as its image in international The paper would outline the concept of counter-terrorism in its first section whereby, it would mark how it got shaped in the aftermath of 9\11 attacks. The second section would look at the scholarly debate of the use or non use of force in counter-terrorism. The third section will deal with the case of the Indian state and spell out its international and internal security predicaments and analyse the ways in which the counter-terrorism efforts of the Indian state is shaped on both the fronts. Counter-terrorism
Conceptually, counter-terrorism could be understood by referring to the meaning of terrorism. There is no one official definition of terrorism accepted by all, which makes it difficult for scholars to define counter-terrorism. Traditionally, terrorism could be understood as a form of political violence perpetrated on non-combatants or civilians with an aim of achieving political gains. Terrorists unleash violence on civilians for signalling their resolve to kill innocent masses in order to challenge the legitimacy of the state (Stapley 2009). Counter-terrorism, hence, could be said to be a set of political and military strategies in order Counter-terrorism, until the horrendous attacks on New York took place in 2001, had been regulated by political and legal instruments. The scale and magnitude of the catastrophe in 2001 called for new enforcements of rules and norms to counter-terrorism both globally and regionally. According to Manoharan (2011), terrorist attacks had happened in the past as well but, hitherto, they hadn’t demonstrated the ruthlessness, lethality and unpredictability of such a scale. The new rules which emerged, based on the use of force, permitted individual repression by criminal prosecution and declaration of war on collectivities by states (Abi- Saab 2004). The United States had been on the front-foot in formulating these new rules and laws, hinging on the use of force to tackle terrorism, safeguarding its homeland as well as its The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1368 along with the UNSCR 1373 made its way through United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Scholars had depicted both the instruments as a shared perception of a common danger to the world public order (Reisman 2001). UNSCR 1373 aims at placing barriers on the movement, organisation and fund-raising activities of terrorist groups. It encourages member-states to share their intelligence on terrorism. The states are also required to adjust their national laws, so that they can ratify the existing international conventions on terrorism. The United Nations Global Strategy on Counter-terrorism of 2006 is another unique instrument to coordinate the actions of countries and strengthen the state’s capacity to combat terrorism. Regional groupings like the European Union, SAARC and ASEAN have also drawn up conventions against terrorism to combat it at a multilateral platform. However, the success of such instruments is limited and could be only ensured by coordination and cooperation at the global, regional, and sub-regional level (Chansoria 2010). The Resolutions along with legal instruments provide for guidelines on which national governments could formulate their counter-terrorism policies and enact legislations to safeguard their national boundaries. These cover a wide array of terrorism-related issues such as improving the quality of identification and travel documents, adopting financial controls to prevent money laundering and strengthening cyber security and so on (Singh 2007). The lacuna in the realm of counter-terrorism efforts is the absence of a comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The international community had been consistently failing to realise this convention since the League of Nations due to the lack of consensus in defining terrorism as adopted by nation-states. The debate: use of force or no use of force
The stress on the use of force to curb the terrorist menace had been deemed essential due to the changing face of terrorism.Manoharan contends that the Oklahoma bombings of 1992, World Trade Centre bombings of 1993 and Mumbai Blasts of 1993 marked the age of ‘New terrorism’. In New terrorism, terrorists seek a lot of actual deaths, whereas in the Old terrorism, terrorists wanted a lot of people to be the audience to violence. New terrorism is characterised by cellular networks of terrorist organisations in the place of a direct chain of command, more transnational in nature with shifting bases, Ideological motivations hinged on religious extremism and are more violent in nature (Kanwal and Manoharan 2010). The 9\11 attacks pulled all the N.A.T.O. countries together to launch the Operation Active Endavour adopting the military concept of defence against terrorism along with making capability and institutional changes ( NATO Official Text 2012). It resulted in the launching of war on Afghanistan in 2001, marking the beginning of the global war on terror. The policy of winning of mind and hearts of the citizens to alter the terrorist brain washing of citizens had also been employed but had been consigned secondary position to the militaristic means. The meaning of the term militaristic means the use of force quelling the terrorist camps and safe havens of terrorists situated in one’s own state or different state. Over a period of time, the N.A.T.O.and its allies had realised the value of deterrence and defence against terrorism and had been trying to balance and develop , both the political and military Traditionally, the use of force had been a prerogative and monopoly of the state and it is the state which has the final authority to sanction the use of force. Clearly, terrorist violence poses a challenge to the monopoly of the state .the use of force by states against a cellular transnational organisation gives rise to asymmetrical warfare which underscores more losses to the state then the terrorist organisation. Counter-terrorism, in the age of new terrorism, as stated by scholars, is supposed to be vibrant, sensitive and multifaceted instead of remaining pegged to one mode of resolution. The use of force alone cannot not yield results, as Williams(2007)in his work states, in the new age the efficacy of the use of force is undergoing stress due to challenges posed by transnational and non-state actors. Terrorist groups have transnational networks which makes the state-old stratagem of warfare ineffective (William 2007). It is also argued that military solution to the problem of terrorism is too big a price to be paid as it threatens to destroy the fundamentals of a democratic state (Weinberg 2008). Scholars have also cautioned against the reckless use of counter-terrorism measures in a democratic state. If counter-terrorism is applied indiscriminately, it could compromise the core values of a democracy. Democracy requires countries to enact anti-terror legislation, law enforcement by agencies and to use the military as an option of the last resort (“The Madrid Agenda”, 2005). Due to the limited success of force in suppressing terrorism, there is an increased emphasis on the legal instruments to deter terrorist offences. International anti-terrorism law and policy had created an impact on the policy framers after the 9/11 attacks. The elevated emphasis is on the adoption of legal aspects of counter-terrorism, by states, through the enactment of domestic legislations, to deter terrorists. These include criminal law, laws against the financing of terrorism, immigration and asylum laws, laws involving technology and the regulation of aviation and maritime security (Ramraj 2005). Notwithstanding the promotion of cooperation amongst states to counter-terrorism, as required by UNSCR 1373, its emphasis on the use of force to quell terrorism lying outside the system of international law has irked the legal experts. Therefore, Abi-Saab (2004) refers to the resolution 1373 as a declaration of international emergency under chapter seven of the UN Charter. Moreover, the rules on counter-terrorism have a few grey patches out of which the most debated is the claim that countries have the right and responsibility to intervene if the host state or sponsor is unable to or unwilling to tackle terrorism (Sasikumar 2010). An interesting component of counter-terrorism is its engagement with terrorists through dialogue. The purpose of having negotiations with terrorists, along with deployment of other counter-terrorism measures, is to stop the violence perpetrated by them. However, it has its trade-offs by way of the terrorists organisation gaining legitimacy and other rebellious groups gaining more encouragement to launch similar methods. The base line here is to prevent the terrorist attacks and maintain the legitimacy of the state (Neuman 2007). There are studies proving efficacy of other means, apart from the use of force and negotiations with terrorists,to contain the menace. In the book ‘Ideological War on Terror’, authors Aldis and Herd (2007)illuminate the need to counter the ideological support for terrorists in order to undercut their support base. Counter-terrorism strategies are required to be comprehensive and inclusive in order to demolish the non-material terrorist base. They also state that Moderate Muslims have shown the potency of peaceful means in countering terrorism in different parts of the world like South East Asia, West Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa. CIST is a rounded up strategy, inclusive of legislations, institutional, intelligence and security architecture along with the dissemination of the moderate Muslim voice in the society. It is argued that states like U.S. are required to use ‘Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism’ (CIST) strategically rather than strategically killing terrorists (Gunaratna It is opined by scholars that after 9/11, the emphasis of counter-terrorism policy in general has been on the strategies of prevention and deterrence and it could be useful to include burn out and backlash strategies. It would help to cut the pool of potential recruits of a terrorist organisation through provisions of economic incentives and alienate the terrorist organisation politically (Ross and Gurr 1989). The Case of the Indian state and counter- terrorism
The Global Terrorism Index of 2012ranks India fourth worst hit state by terrorism after Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Kumar 2012). Despite being rattled with terrorist strikes intermittently, the Indian state doesn’t have a concerted counter-terrorism policy. This is the first dimension in which the Indian state differs from the Global Northwith respect to the counter- terrorism. Lack of counter-terrorism policy is one of India’s prime drawbacks in circumventing the threat of terrorism. Security experts have voiced now and then to have a coherent counter-terrorism strategy. Kalyanraman from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) called for drawing up of an annual assessment of terrorism in the state helping in anticipating the evolution of the terrorism to help formulating counter-terrorism strategies and operations (Kalyanaraman 2010). India is the largest democracy in the world and is comparatively a strong state then the three worst terrorist affected states. By the logic of which the Indian state should not hesitate in using force to quell terrorism as it has much resources at disposal. However, experts like Ajay Sahni(2013)and Sood(2011) emphasise that the Indian state’s counter-terrorism efforts are half baked and calls for an added stress on the use of force in counter-terrorism, be it insurgency or secessionist movement, threatening the security of the state. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that the use of force is not easier in Indian context by VikramSood (2011),for counter-terrorism is different for the US and India; the reason is attributed to the fact that the global rules are actually shaped by the threat perception of the US and its allies which is primarily Islamic jihad. Whereas, India’s problem with terrorism is far more attenuated where it has to tackle jihad and manage the fissures on its own soil manifested in the form of insurgency, naxalism, left wing extremism and maoist violence. Samarjeet Ghosh (2010) states in ‘New Terrorism and India’ that “at a broader level, the Indian state has actually become a laboratory of sorts, so far as acts of terror are concerned, with the perpetrators believing in the logic that if the world’s largest democracy can be rattled, so can other democracies.” He opines that India’s case with terrorism is marked by external dimensions of the irreversible geographical neighbourhood of Pakistan which harbours many terrorist organisations in the world, and internal dimensions of divides on the counts of religion, ethnicity, language and inequality in wealth and caste. In 2013, the government had identified 65 terror groups active in the Indian state. According to R.P.N. Singh, the Minister of State for Home: one needs to look out for the foreign strings attached to these terror outfits with regards to shelter, weapons, finance and training( Zackey 2013). The challenge from terrorist comes at two levels. One is international terrorism and another is the internal terror strike. The International terrorism is the one which had caused most of the grievous attacks which includes the Mumbai blast (1993), the attacks on the Indian parliament (2001) and the 26\11 attacks in 2008. All these attacks involved some form of abetment coming from Pakistan. Earlier China had also been involved in fomenting insurgency in the North Eastern part of the state. However, according to today’s scenario the sub-conventional warfare launched by Pakistan resulting in the asymmetric warfare between the two countries is a grave security predicament for the Indian state. Pakistan’s relation with the Indian state further gets complicated due to the possession of nuclear weapons by both the countries. Late Brajesh Mishra (2011), the former National Security Advisor expressed his discontent that the Indian state is not taking bold steps which involves greater role of Indian defence in order to end Pakistan adventurism. According to him negotiations with Pakistan is not going to alleviate the problem of Pakistan and terrorism should not be relegated to a secondary status in order to keep the peace process alive. However, he certainly forgets one thing which VikramSood (2011)had captured that the Indian state could not pursue a hot war with Pakistan to nab the terrorists unlike U.S. because Pakistan is India’s immediate neighbour and any hot pursuit will escalate to a nuclear flashpoint, since both the countries possess nuclear weapons. The glimpses of such a misadventurism was caught when the India state launched Operation Parakramin December 2001 where massive troop mobilization took place at the Line Of Control (LOC) to which Pakistan responded by amassing its troop at LOC. The troops were finally called back six months later due to international mediation from U.S., saving the world from a nuclear war. Thus it is clear, that the Indian state cannot go for a military strike on Pakistan and its hands are tied down by the potential disastrous Internal terror strikes
The Indian state had been challenged by internal problems which include Insurgency in North Eastern part of the state and Kashmir, secessionist movements in Punjab and Left Wing Extrimism in eastern and central India. The Naga and Mizo insurgency went on for 19 years while the Punjab Insurgency got protracted for 14 years. Meanwhile, the deployment of armed forces in J&K and the North Eastern part of the state was done due to the lack of adequate police paraphernalia. According to Rajesh Rajagopalan (2007), India’s approach to counter insurgency, since its independence, had been guided by conventional war biases because of India’s experience with Pakistan and China. The external threat scenario had shaped the counter insurgency doctrine of India. However, he opines that over a period of time it had been realised by the armed forces that use of force could not end insurgency and could only contain violence to lay the ground for political solutions. He further argues that the Indian state’s counter insurgency had been relatively less militaristic and more political in nature then counter insurgency operations of other states. Opposite to the findings of Rajagopalan, K.P.S Gill bespeaks about the curbing of the militancy in Punjab effectively, with the help of greater use of police force and counter- terrorism strategy then the use of political palliatives. He goes to the extent of voicing that "a state should not hesitate in using force in order to defend freedom, democracy and lawful governance". Other scholar give importance to the rule of law in counter insurgency policy where both the enforcers and citizens work within the bounds of laid down rules and laws minimising the situation of misperception and misunderstanding(Pant2011 ). The problems of Naxalism had rocked the state for many years and suppression of Naxalism through force alone is bound to backfire. The Naxal movement or left wing extremism was launched to eradicate the class divisions and claim socio economic rights of peasants. Therefore, it needs a rounded up holistic solution which encompasses political, security, economic and The third aspect in which the Indian state’s counter-terrorism efforts suffer is the obvious lack of capability in place and dearth of resources to tap on. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in India called for structural and institutional changes in the aftermath of 26/11. It constituted a National Investigation Agency (NIA) and proposals were made to plug the holes in the security apparatus by stationing the National Security Guard (NSG) in the major cities to be rushed in exigencies. The debate over the National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC) has been a result of the entire overhaul of the security apparatus, pivoted upon the idea of enhanced coordination of actions and exchange of intelligence to grapple with the problem of intelligence failure (Kanwal 2012). However, Ajay Sahni (2012) had dubbed the proposed revamping by the government as a knee jerk reaction and the useless meta-layering of institutions without doing away with the drawbacks in the existing institutions. Praveen Swami (2013) has written extensively on the state of intelligence in India which he calls an “intelligence famine” and expresses the doubts over the gaping holes in the counter- However analysts argue that the problem in the counter-terrorism efforts of the Indian state has to do more with capacity failure rather than intelligence failure (Staniland 2009). In the event of a terrorist strike, the fragmented nature of Indian counter-terrorism efforts are supplemented with “knee jerk” reactions in an episodic manner (Kaplan and Bajoria 2008).There is the understaffing of Research Analysts Wing and Intelligence Bureau; the intelligence architecture of the Indian state, which is caused due to scarcity of experts in the fields. The better career prospects offered by private sector drive the professionals away from the public services causing vacancies in the intelligence architecture of the Indian state Conclusion
It is interesting to trace the trajectory of counter-terrorism efforts of the Indian state and the findings show that first, India lacks a coherent counter-terrorism policy due to the varied nature of terror strikes like cross border terrorism, Naxalism, insurgency and Maoist violence; second, the international terrorism and internal security problems are tackle primarily through political means. It is increasingly realised in the case of insurgency that political resolution of the problem would be the better resort; third, the drawbacks in the counter-terrorism paraphernalia is caused due to the short sightedness and hastiness of the policy framers where instead of calling for substantial changes in the capacity building, they are concentrating more on the issues of erecting more bureaucratic structures. My assertion that the Indian state resorts to a relatively more political management of the problem of terrorism is proven by earmarking its trajectory of the counter-terrorism efforts. The status of the Indian state a democratic state with a predominant centre–left ideology in the political circle, there is a natural aversion to the use of force and towards the role of the armed forces. Recently, the government had been proposing for recoiling of AFSPA but the armed forces does not want to do so, remarking that if the condition worsens in these disturbed states in future, the civilian government would not have the guts to bring the army back( Banerjee 2013). The second reason for the Indian state to settle the scores politically is the different nature of internal security problems faced by it. One cannot come up for a single solution for all range of political violence perpetrated by Insurgents, Maoists, and Left wing Extremists. Moreover, use of force is bound to backfire and in a democratic state and would irk the populous, turning them against the government. Third, the cross border terrorism cannot be tackled through the use of force due to the fear of escalation to a flashpoint scene. However, this paper does not state that the Indian state doesn’t employ force at all. It does use force, but the militaristic component of its counter-terrorism efforts is severely curtailed by the illustrations given above. The Indian state didn’t join in the Global War on Terror and this is due to the general scepticism amongst the policy makers in tackling the menace of terrorism The Indian state had been a victim of terrorism for more than thirty years for now. It is required for India to put a strap on the problem through effective policies and rules. This is imperative for the Indian state for the maintenance of the security within its boundaries . Also such measures would help India to be known as a responsible state in the international community , which is essential for achieving its aspirations of being a powerful state in the system. Inspite of being high on the Global Terrorism Index, it hadn’t been able to safeguard its citizens from different forms of political violence; the primary function of any state. The Indian state has to gear up its counter-terrorism efforts in order to improve its image by adopting the emerging global norms on counter-terrorism which is triggered largely by United Nations and other multilateral organisation’s resolutions against terrorism. With the war in Afghanistan getting over by next year, it is probable that the counter-terrorism efforts of both the halves of the globe might coincide and states might prefer employing political means more than the use of force to counter-terrorism. How effective such a strategy would Bibliography
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